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Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform
Adrian Vermeule*

Many proposals to reform the rules of the Supreme Court game are currently
under discussion.1 Which of these proposals lie within the politically feasible set, and
which are ruled out by political constraints? In what follows, I will sketch the shape of
those constraints and describe the main political mechanisms that produce them. I use
the failure of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in 1937 as a running example,
supplemented by comparisons with the flurry of reform plans – mostly unsuccessful –
offered during Reconstruction. The main thesis is that reform of the Court requires
political conditions that have a self-negating tendency. The very conditions that produce
demand for structural reform of the Court also tend to produce counterforces that block
the movement for reform. The point is not of course that structural reform is impossible,
in the sense that it is always ruled out by political constraints. In particular cases, the
demand for reform may be just strong enough, and the counterforces produced by that
demand just weak enough, that a reform proposal can slip through. Yet reform cannot be
predicted in advance, or relied upon; it is systematically unlikely to occur. The stronger
the movement for reform, the higher the obstacles that must be surmounted.
My principal interest is in detailing the mechanisms that produce political
constraints on Supreme Court reform, regardless of how tight those constraints turn out to
be. However, I will also suggest, without attempting to provide systematic evidence, that
the constraints are in fact quite restrictive. The ash-heap of history is piled high with
reform proposals that have attracted no supporters (other than those who formulated
them); attracted academic supporters but no political backers; or attracted political
backers but no popular following. Almost all ideas for Supreme Court reform die in
committee, literally or metaphorically. The constitutional and statutory rules governing
the Court – the number of its members, their terms of tenure, the voting and quorum rules
that govern their actions, and so on – have in most cases remained unchanged at least
since Reconstruction, and in some cases since the first Judiciary Act of 1789. Not
everything has held constant – the switch to discretionary cert jurisdiction in 1925 is a
salient example – but in the broad, structural reform of the Court is exceedingly rare. All
else equal, the higher the stakes of a reform proposal, the more opposition it will generate
*
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and the less likely it is to succeed. The reform proposals that do succeed, conversely, are
likely to be of marginal importance, at least when compared to the ambitious model of
the court-packing plan.
Section 1 defines reform as structural change in the constitutional and statutory
rules that govern the Supreme Court game, as opposed to substitution of new players for
old ones (through appointments) or new behavior by old players under the old rules (a
“switch in time”). Sections 2 through 5 turn to the mechanisms that constrain reform by
provoking counterforces to the reform movement. Although some of these mechanisms
apply to institutional reform generally, some apply only to reform of the Court. Court
reform both partakes in the general difficulty of institutional reform, and presents
additional difficulties of its own.
Section 2 discusses the problem of multidimensional politics. The large national
coalitions necessary for Supreme Court reform will typically be assembled on other
issue-dimensions, and will fracture when judicial reform comes to the fore. Section 3
discusses the problem of the optimal majority. Reform movements must steer between
Scylla and Charybdis: a majority that is too small will be blocked at the vetogates of the
legislative process, while a majority that is too large will provoke a backlash spurred by
fears of tyranny. Section 4 discusses the basic tradeoff between impartiality and
motivation. Structural reforms that would be adopted behind a veil of uncertainty will be
and seem impartial, but in general no politically influential group will be motivated to
support them. Conversely, proposals that produce short-term benefits for particular
groups will attract motivated supporters, but will also provoke opposition. Section 5
suggests, more generally, that political crisis is both a precondition for and an obstacle to
reform of the Court. In a brief conclusion, I consider the relevance of political
constraints from the standpoint of both analysts and advocates of reform. Although
analysts should consider political constraints, advocates of reform should not.
1. “Reform”
We may define reform both by reference to paradigm cases and at the conceptual
level. I will take as the paradigm of reform Roosevelt’s 1937 court-packing bill. So far
as relevant here, the proposal would have added one Justice for each Justice over the age
of 70 who had served ten years and who did not retire within six months of his 70th
birthday, up to a total membership of fifteen Justices.2 Roosevelt had carried 48 states in
the 1936 election, and commanded filibuster-proof majorities in both the House and
senate (although we will see that the Democratic coalition would fracture along the fault
line of Supreme Court reform). My main thesis about the episode will be that the very
conditions that produced such obvious potential for reforming the Court also produced
the political constraints that blocked reform.
At the conceptual level, I will generalize from the court-packing example to
stipulate that reform means a proposal for change in the rules of the Supreme Court
2
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game. This definition makes reform synonymous with structural reform, including the
number of Justices, their tenure, voting rules and so forth. It excludes both (1) a
substitution of new players for old players through the appointments process and (2) a
change in the actions that the old players take under the old rules.
This definition has the consequence that the indirect effects of the court-packing
plan did not produce reform, in the structural sense I have indicated. Roosevelt
eventually obtained no less than seven Supreme Court appointments, producing a cadre
of likeminded Justices. For reasons discussed below, however, this does not count as
reform. Furthermore, if the selection of new players does not count, a change in the
behavior of the old players does not count either. Suppose that the threat of courtpacking – or the anticipation of some threat of that kind – produced a “switch in time,” in
which Justice Roberts changed his vote to uphold politically controversial economic and
social legislation. (Here I am bracketing a set of historical controversies over whether
there was any such switch, and whether, if there was, it was caused by the court-packing
plan).3 This change in the actions taken by old Justices under the old rules is not
structural reform; it is tacking with the prevailing political winds. Besides the courtpacking plan, another example involves the proposal, floated both during Reconstruction
and the New Deal, to require a 2/3 vote of the Justices to invalidate legislation on
constitutional grounds. During Reconstruction, the proposal lacked a critical mass of
support, in part because the Court ducked many of the central constitutional issues posed
by Reconstruction legislation and thus vented away the growing pressure for reform.4
Why define reform so narrowly? If Roosevelt obtained much of what he wanted
through the switch in time, and through appointments, why classify the court-packing
plan as a failure? Roosevelt himself said that although he had lost the court-packing
battle, he had won the broader war.5 From an even broader perspective, however, the
problem is that changes not amounting to structural reform are only a temporary
palliative. As long as the rules themselves remain unchanged, later periods can see a
recurrence of the problems that motivated reform in the first place. Even if the outcome
of the court-packing fight was good for Roosevelt or the New Deal in the short run,6 it
may have been bad for the polity in the long run.
3
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This point holds whether one considers the actual aim of the court-packing plan or
its nominal aim. (Below, I will discuss the divergence between the plan’s actual aim and
it nominal aim, which produced the contemporary perception that the plan was a thinlydisguised ploy for packing the Court with ideologically compatible Justices). As for the
actual aim of the court-packing plan – clearing away judicial obstruction to New Deal
policies – some of Roosevelt’s advisers “argued that Justices who could switch so easily
in his favor could just as easily jump back once the pressure was off.”7 Although no such
switchback took place in the period, the advisers were right in a larger time frame. The
absence of a formal New Deal amendment to the Constitution permits or at least
encourages the Court to flirt with retro-restrictive interpretations of the Commerce
Clause, in line with a broader movement to reinstate the pre-1937 “Constitution in
Exile.”8 As for the nominal goal of the court-packing plan – reducing the fraction of
Justices whose sell-by date has passed -- the direct effect of the Roosevelt plan would
have been to place a structural cap on the fraction of the Court’s membership that was 70
years old or more, an issue that has arisen again in recent years.9
The narrow definition of reform makes clear the first sense in which Supreme
Court reform tends to be a self-negating enterprise. The conditions that produce a real
threat of reform will also, for the same reasons, tend to produce a switch in time that
reduces the demand for reform. The threat of reform tightens the political constraints on
the Justices, but a switch in time can buy off the threat. Of course, if it is clear ex ante
that reform will be blocked by political constraints, then the threat of reform is not
credible from the Justices’ standpoint. From the standpoint of reformers, however, the
ability of the Justices to tack as the winds set against them is itself another political
constraint on reform. The judicial volte-face saps the political demand for structural
change.
2. The Problem of Multidimensional Politics
I begin, in this section, with the well-known problem that majority coalitions
organized along other lines may fracture once reform of the Supreme Court is put on the
table. Given huge majorities in both Houses of Congress, and a landslide victory in 1936,
how could Roosevelt have failed to secure enactment of the court-packing plan? In a
standard account, the New Deal coalition that had been created in and for the elections of
1932 and 1936 splintered badly over the court-packing issue. In the latter election,
Saves Nine: Institutions, Strategic Actors, and FDR’s Court-Packing Plan,” Public Choice, 113 (2002),
301-324.
7
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9
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Roosevelt had campaigned on a largely backward-looking platform that asked for a
national referendum on the first wave of New Deal reform. The issue of judicial reform
was not raised. The court-packing plan of 1937 then split the Roosevelt coalition by
introducing a new issue-dimension. Southern and Western Democrats who supported the
New Deal on other grounds were opposed to tampering with the Court. In general,
conservative Democrats and Republicans found common cause in opposing courtpacking.
Stipulating to the validity of this account, the important point is that it captures
more than the happenstance of 1936 and 1937. Generally speaking, reform of the
Supreme Court is rarely a central organizing issue in national elections. The Court is just
not that important, viewed in a larger perspective, and compared to the bedrock issues of
wages, taxes, housing and other policies that do determine national political elections.
Occasionally, as in 1968, the Court will come to be loosely associated with a national
political issue, such as “crime,” but political platforms will be vague about what to do
about the Court, as a means to paper over differences within the majority coalition. By
and large, national coalitions must be organized on other issue-dimensions, which means
that they well be inherently unstable when reform of the Supreme Court becomes the
central issue. The conditions that make Supreme Court reform possible – that a large
national majority be organized – also tend to militate against the success of the reform
proposal. The majority coalition will tend to come unglued when faced with the reform
issue itself.
So far I have mentioned two possibilities. First, straightforwardly, a coalition
may be organized around an issue and have intense preferences concerning that issue, as
with the Roosevelt coalition and the New Deal economic program. Second, as in the case
of the court-packing plan, a coalition that is organized around one issue may fracture
when faced with a different issue, as to which coalition members have intense
preferences in opposite directions. Thirdly, however, there is another important
possibility: a coalition may be organized around one issue and, on a separate issue of
court reform, hold only weak preferences or even be indifferent. In this scenario, reform
is possible because the coalition’s leaders, elected on another program, may seize the
opportunity to implement reform if they happen to favor it, without fracturing their
political base.10
However, this is in general possible only with reform proposals that provoke no
strong opposition, which will also tend to be low-stakes proposals for marginal reforms.
Where the governing coalition is indifferent because the benefit to them of the reform is
small, but there is strong opposition because the costs to others are high, leaders will be
unable to mobilize enough support to secure enactment. More generally, the higher the
stakes in a reform proposal, the more opposition it will tend to provoke. To be sure,
reform can and does occur, but this tendency means that most of the reforms that do
succeed will be marginal accomplishments.

10
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3. The Problem of the Optimal Majority
In this section, I turn to a more speculative account of the failure of the courtpacking plan. It is obvious that a reform movement may fail because it commands no
majority or commands a majority that is too small; the foregoing account, based on the
fracturing of the Democratic coalition, suggests that the rump of Roosevelt supporters
was too small to overcome the opposition. The problem of an excessively small majority,
however, is matched by an equal and opposite problem: the majority favoring reform may
also be too large.
The first risk, that of an insufficient majority, is familiar. At the level of national
public opinion, even a clear majority may fail to translate into a majority in national
lawmaking institutions, given certain distributions of voters in a first-past-the-post
electoral system. Even if there exists a majority coalition in Congress that is organized
on the issue of judicial reform – thus bracketing the problem of multidimensional politics
– vetogates in the legislative process, including bicameralism, congressional committees,
and the filibuster, may allow minorities on the reform issue to block change. The puzzle
of the court-packing episode, however, is that after the 1936 election, Roosevelt held the
presidency and partisan majorities in both Houses of Congress so large as to negate the
threat of a partisan filibuster. On paper the vetogates had already been unlocked, yet the
reform plan failed ignominiously.11
Crucially, the very size of the Roosevelt majority itself seems to have produced
widespread public concern about the court-packing plan. In this perception, it suddenly
became clear that Roosevelt effectively controlled the non-judicial branches of
government, that the narrow Court majority was one of the few remaining focal points for
resistance to the New Deal program, and that a risk of executive tyranny had arisen.12 In
the general case, a majority that is too large may provoke a backlash by creating fears of
untrammeled power among those who distrust government in general or the executive in
particular, and by increasing the underlying distrust itself. As Senator Henry Ashurst put
it, “[]even many people who believe in President Roosevelt . . . were haunted by the
terrible fear that some future President might, by suddenly enlarging the Supreme Court,
suppress free speech, free assembly, and invade other Constitutional guarantees of
citizens.”13
On this view, proposing a plan to enlarge the number of Justices played a crucial
role in sharpening public concern about executive despotism generally and Roosevelt’s
intentions in particular. Two factors may explain why this was so. The first is the
“normative power of the factual.” The number of Justices had been set at nine since
1869, when the Reconstruction Congress increased the number from seven in order to
11
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Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death,” Duke Law Journal (1985), 673-94. I touch upon the
second plan in Section 4 below.
12
See Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn at p. 137.
13
Quoted after Michael Nelson, “The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode
of 1937,” Political Science Quarterly 103: 267-293, at 276.

7

give Ulysses S. Grant extra appointments.14 It is a maxim of political psychology that
such longstanding rules or invented traditions,15 whose dubious origin is usually lost in
the mists of time (from the standpoint of later generations), often come to seem
normatively significant. “Although the number of Justices had been changed several
times before, many believed that the Constitution specified nine. One writer encountered
an elderly lady who protested, ‘If nine judges were enough for George Washington, they
should be enough for President Roosevelt.’”16
The precise mechanisms that generate the normative power of the factual are as
yet poorly understood; conjecturally, there is some relationship to the endowment effect,
under which subjects value what they have more than what they lack,17 or to the
phenomenon of status quo bias.18 The norms that arise from institutional arrangements
seen to be longstanding, however, tend to support an inference that actors who
contravene such norms are generally untrustworthy. Partially-informed publics or voters
may use the following heuristic: any political actor who seeks to change the rules in the
middle of the game is untrustworthy, presumptively motivated by partisan advantage or a
desire for unchecked power.
The second factor was a widespread perception that the court-packing plan was a
disingenuous proposal. Although purportedly based on a concern about the competence
of aging judges, the plan was widely seen as a gambit to increase the number of New
Deal supporters on the Court. When it became clear that the initial reaction to the plan
was negative, Roosevelt tried to link the two issues, suggesting that antiquated judges
would also have obsolete and socially harmful views.19 By that time, however, the
damage had been done.
This episode illustrates the dilemmas inherent in “the civilizing force of
hypocrisy.”20 Those who were unsure about the merits of the plan seem to have relied
upon another political heuristic: that disingenuity implies bad motives. On this view,
dictatorship was the real face behind the mask of the court-packing plan. It does not
follow, however, that the same voters would have seen Roosevelt as well-motivated had
he openly confessed to the goal of removing ideological opponents from the court; that
goal could in turn be condemned as partisanship. Political actors are constrained to offer
a public-regarding justification for reform, one that does not map too obviously onto their
14
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ideological views or partisan interests. Roosevelt failed by offering a plan that was too
transparently motivated by other considerations, but sincerity about those other
considerations would not have improved the situation.
Moreover, the constraint that one must offer a purportedly neutral criterion for
reform was far from toothless; it actually caused Roosevelt to overshoot the mark set by
his political interests. Needing at most four more loyalist votes to gain control of the
Court,21 Roosevelt offered a neutral principle, in the form of an age cutoff of 70, that
would have given him no less than six additional appointments. With an age cutoff of 74,
only five more seats would have been added,22 but that figure would have made the plan
appear even more obviously pretextual. Because three Justices were clumped at age 74,
it was not possible to propose a cut-off that would have given Roosevelt exactly four
more appointments. Even were such a criterion possible, however, it would have been so
precisely tailored to Roosevelt’s interests as to be suspicious in its own right. The
overshooting plausibly contributed to the impression that Roosevelt sought dictatorial
powers. On the other hand, the 70-year figure was a neutral-seeming round number, and
had the political advantage of using the civilizing force of hypocrisy as a sword:
Roosevelt’s most intractable opponent among the horsemen, Justice McReynolds, had at
an earlier time himself proposed a retirement age of 70 for all federal judges.23
The puzzle for this whole line of explanation is why the same voters, or a decisive
fraction of the same voters, who supported Roosevelt and congressional Democrats in the
1936 election would react against the Roosevelt’s large majority after the fact. The
multidimensional character of coalition politics would supply an answer to this, but we
are assuming away that issue here. Assuming, counterfactually, that the 1936 election
had been organized as a referendum on the courts, why would ex ante supporters of the
New Deal become opponents of Rooseveltian tyranny ex post?

21

In fact, there is a plausible case for picking any number from one to four as the magic number needed to
gain control; which answer is correct depends on how the question is specified. The simplistic argument
for one is that many of the salient decisions invalidating New Deal programs before 1937 were issued by a
vote of 5-4. But the Court was divided into three camps, not two. The Four Horsemen (Butler,
McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter) were reliable anti-New Deal votes, whereas Brandeis, Cardozo
and Stone were reliable in the other direction. Hughes and Roberts were, in the view of ardent New
Dealers at least, unreliable weather-vanes. Even if one of the Horsemen were replaced with a Roosevelt
loyalist, a coalition of Hughes, Roberts and the remaining three horsemen could still defeat New Deal
programs by a 5-4 vote. Assuming a court with a constant membership of nine, Roosevelt needed two new
appointments to be certain of success. However, if new appointments were additions rather than
replacements, no less than three appointments would be necessary to ensure a 6-6 tie (which would become
a 7-5 majority whenever either of the two waverers joined the liberals), while four appointments would be
necessary to ensure a 7-6 victory. Under any scenario, however, six new appointments would be excessive,
so the criterion Roosevelt offered overshot the mark.
22
On Feburary 2, 1937, the date of the plan’s formal introduction, the ages of the Justices were Brandeis
(80), Van Devanter (77), McReynolds, Sutherland and Hughes (74), Butler (70), Cardozo (66), Stone (64),
and Roberts (62). Ignoring Hughes and Roberts as unpredictable, any cut-off less than 71 and greater than
66 would maximize the difference between the number of conservatives covered (4) and the number of
liberals covered (1). However, a cutoff at age 70 also possessed the other benefits discussed in text.
23
See William E. Leuchtenburg, “The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Court-Packing’ Plan,” Supreme
Court Review (1966), 347, p. 391-92.

9

I conjecture that the striking turnabout occurred because electoral decisions are
uncoordinated. Rational voters, conditional on having entered the voting booth, vote
expressively rather than instrumentally.24 (I bracket here the well-known prior puzzle of
why rational people would vote in the first place.) Any particular individual voter or
group of voters, if assured with certainty of being the decisive voter, might prefer a
division of partisan power across national lawmaking institutions, including the Supreme
Court. Given that any individual voting decision has effectively zero chance of being
decisive, however, voters will indulge expressive statements of loyalty – to Roosevelt or
to the Democratic party -- that are effectively costless. Once appraised that other voters
have done likewise, however, the very voters who supported Roosevelt and the
congressional Democrats seem to have become concerned that the collective outcome of
uncoordinated choices had produced total Rooseveltian dominance of the national
government.
The upshot of all this is that reform proposals need an optimal majority to succeed
– one that is neither too large nor too small. In the court-packing episode, the political
conditions that produced a sufficient congressional majority to unlock the vetogates and
surmount the hurdles of the lawmaking process also caused the reform movement to
overshoot the mark, producing a backlash animated by fear of executive tyranny. The
very factors that made reform possible also produced counterforces that blocked its
accomplishment. Again, this is only to identify a mechanism that tends to block reform,
not an iron law that reform can never succeed. In some cases, reform proposals can slip
between Scylla and Charybdis; the Reconstruction-era changes to the Court’s
composition are an example. In general, however, it is much more likely that any given
proposal will be sucked into the whirlpool of vetogates or swallowed up in a political
backlash against an excessive majority.
4. The Veil of Uncertainty, Delay, and Motivation
A standard idea in constitutional design is that less information can be better then
more. Depriving political actors of information about how to promote their narrow selfinterest will cause them to behave as though animated by impartial motives. The veil of
ignorance,25 or uncertainty,26 subjects decisionmakers to uncertainty about the
distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision. This distributive
uncertainty can take one of two basic forms. In the Rawlsian veil of ignorance,
decisionmakers are placed under a constraint of ignorance about their own identities and
attributes. This introduces uncertainty by allowing the decisionmaker to know the
distributive consequences of a decision across citizens—call them A and B—but denying
the decisionmaker the knowledge of whether she herself occupies A’s position or B’s
position. The more common and less radical version, however, is the veil of uncertainty.
24

See Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision, The Pure Theory of Electoral
Preference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 3: “The Nature of Expressive Returns.”
25
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Journal of Political Economy, 63 (1955), 309-21; Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason
of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 30.
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Although the relevant decisionmakers know their own current identities and interests, the
veil introduces uncertainty about who will reap the greater gains from the decision.
How is the veil of uncertainty produced? One technique27 is to enact reforms at a
certain time that will not take effect until a later time, perhaps years or even decades
hence. Delay takes advantage of a preexisting uncertainty—the inherent unpredictability
of the decisionmakers’ long-term interests—that would otherwise be overwhelmed by the
incentives to focus on short-term considerations. By confining the range of the decision’s
application to cover only the period (beyond the delay period) in which decisionmakers’
interests are unpredictable, a delay rule ensures that the only period current
decisionmakers can affect is one that is, from their ex ante standpoint, subject to a veil of
uncertainty.
By diluting current decisionmaker’s ability to assess where their own interests lie,
delayed enactments might be thought to ease the path of reform. One might imagine a
variant of Roosevelt’s proposal in which the legislation, although enacted now, would not
take effect until after the 1940 election.28 In the general case, delayed implementation
might buy off the opposition that would otherwise be offered by political actors whose
interests would be harmed by a proposal with immediate effect. In a similar vein, the
recent proposal for reforming the Justices’ tenure to a fixed term of years, offered by Paul
Carrington and Roger Cramton, in effect delays the proposal’s onset date by
grandfathering currently sitting justices. The grandfathering presumably buys off selfinterested opposition on the part of sitting Justices.29
In fact, however, successful delayed enactments are quite rare. A major reason is
the basic tradeoff between impartiality and motivation.30 Delay may buy off opposition,
but it also eliminates the short-term, self-interested benefit that would accrue to the
political actors who would otherwise support the proposal and incur the costs of
shepherding it through. In the language of 18th-century political psychology, delay
replaces self-interested motivation with impartial reason, but the latter motivation is
frequently too feeble to produce action; the pallid claims of reason rarely provoke the
same degree of energy and activity as the prospect of self-interested gain. In general, the
high opportunity costs of political action, constricted agenda space in Congress, sharp
limits on the amount of time the executive can spend on any one project, the horizon of
re-election, and the tendency to discount the future, all push political actors to rank
27

For discussion of “delayed-effect” rules, see Adrian Vermeule, “Veil of Ignorance Rules in
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projects by the amount of benefit they produce in the near term. Projects that will
produce large collective benefits in the long run, but whose distributive valence is
uncertain, will be subordinated to projects that produce larger factional benefits in the
short run. In the case of Roosevelt, a court-packing plan with a delayed effective date
would not have advanced Roosevelt’s immediate goal of clearing judicial obstruction to
New Deal programs. In the case of the Carrington and Cramton proposal, the safe
prediction is that it will never be enacted. The delayed onset of the proposal makes its
political valence uncertain, which in turn means that no current political actor will be
strongly motivated to shoulder the burdens of enactment. Political action oriented
towards the long run tends to occur only where the political valence of the proposal is
clear ex ante, as in proposals for environmental regulation with long-term effects.
Overall, the tradeoff between impartiality and motivation creates another Scylla
and Charybdis through which reform proposals must slip. On the one hand, stipulating
that a proposal should have a delayed effective date helps to remove the taint of selfinterested or partisan motives, and avoids triggering the heuristic that one should not try
to change the rules in the middle of the game. On the other hand, delaying the proposal’s
effect means that concrete problems of the here and now, the sort of problems most likely
to motivate reform, cannot be addressed. The delaying tactic makes reform possible by
creating an appearance of impartiality and buying off current opposition, but the tactic
also makes the reform less likely to be proposed and pursued. Conversely, the short-term
interest that motivates reform itself tends to create self-limiting political constraints.
Proposals that produce short-term benefits for particular groups will attract motivated
supporters, but will also provoke opposition.
5. Crisis, Reform and Constitutional Amendment
In this section, I will briefly generalize some of the foregoing points. A standard
idea is that political constraints limit institutional reform until some exogenous shock
creates a crisis that destabilizes extant institutions.31 The resulting uncertainty can
promote reform, as previously discussed. Exogenous shocks or crises, however, are a
necessary but insufficient condition for reform. This is because crisis has two effects
pulling in opposite directions: crisis destabilizes institutions, but it also tends to create
new political constraints that shore up those institutions against change. As relevant here,
times of crisis both increase the demand for Supreme Court reform and also tend to create
political obstacles to that reform. For concreteness, I focus on a dilemma that plagued
Roosevelt: should reform of the Court be attempted through the process of constitutional
amendment or through the legislative process? The latter path better suits the conditions
of urgency that give rise to the demand for reform, yet also creates an appearance of
partisan manipulation. The former path seems more suitable for structural reform, yet
may take too long to be an effective response to a crisis.
Roosevelt and his advisors ultimately chose the legislative path, in large part
because they feared that the amendment process would unduly delay reform. The sense
31
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of national economic crisis that gave rise to the New Deal agenda also implied that
immediate action was necessary. As Attorney General Homer Cummings said, “the
Administration cannot very well let its social program bog down because of adverse
Supreme Court decisions, and, on the other hand, the delays incident to amendment are
rather appalling.”32 However, the decision to proceed legislatively also created or
strengthened opposition to the substance of the reform proposal.
In 1937, opponents of Roosevelt’s proposal for statutory court reform fell into
three camps. Some flatly opposed the content of the proposal, whatever its legal form.
Others said that the proposal should not or could not be enacted legislatively, but could
and should be enacted as a constitutional amendment. Within the latter group, we may
distinguish those who held their position in bad faith and those who held it in good faith.
Roosevelt suspected pervasive bad faith, saying that “the same forces which are now
calling for the amendment process would turn around and fight ratification on the simple
ground that they do not like the particular amendment adopted by the Congress.”33
However, the bill was also opposed by some, such as Senator George Norris, who
genuinely favored the substance of the proposal, but who also genuinely thought that
constitutional amendment was the proper path.34
The rationale for the last position was never clearly stated. Although an
amendment would be necessary if the bill were unconstitutional, the arguments to that
effect were quite weak, given the Reconstruction precedents in which Congress had
manipulated the number of Justices at will. In any event, the principal concerns
motivating good-faith opposition to the statutory path seem to have been nonlegal.
Norris worried that anything short of an amendment would “plague our descendants”
because “it does not strike permanently at the evil we want to remedy.”35 As suggested
above, this concern applies even more strongly to nonstructural reform accomplished by
constraining the Justices to execute a switch in time. Another, vaguer intuition seems to
have been that it was inherently more suitable to pursue structural reform of the judiciary
by amendment rather than by statute. The intuition, similar to the heuristics described
above, is that changing the rules of the judicial game by legislation is an attack on the
referee by one of the players, and thus presumptively arises from partisan or selfinterested motivations.
Overall, the choice of legal instruments for judicial reform presented Roosevelt
and his advisers with a dilemma. On the one hand, the New Dealers knew from personal
experience that “[d]emands for . . . constitutional revision tends to arise in times of crisis
in which waiting is an unaffordable luxury.”36 The crisis that produced the demand for
reform also constrained the choice between available paths to reform, by ruling out the
32
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more protracted amendment process. On the other hand, the statutory avenue itself
provoked political opposition that would not otherwise have arisen. That opposition
came both from bad-faith opponents who were enabled to argue for the amendment path,
and were thus given an extra arrow for their rhetorical quivers, and also from good-faith
opponents, whose preference for the amendment path put them in unwilling coalition
with the bad-faith opponents. The very crisis that produced the demand for reform, by
constraining the feasible paths to reform, also produced endogenous opposition to the
alternative path. In this sense, the impetus to Supreme Court reform that arose out of the
New Deal crisis had a self-negating tendency.
Again, this conjunction of forces and counterforces is not inevitable.
Occasionally, reform will slip through because there is an evident structural problem,
because all concerned are uncertain about the future effects of the reform, and because no
group will lose much from current enactment; the constitutional amendments that have
restructured presidential succession may count as an example.37 In general, however,
such a constellation of happy circumstances is both fortuitous and rare. Structural
reform, especially of the Court, is systematically unlikely and unreliable.
Conclusion
I have suggested a range of mechanisms that systematically tend to make
Supreme Court reform a self-negating enterprise. The very conditions that give rise to
the demand for reform also tend to create political constraints on reform. Whether valid
or not, this thesis would be relevant from the standpoint of the external analyst, such as
the academic social scientist. I hasten to add, however, that the shape of the politically
feasible set is not obviously a relevant consideration for practical advocates of reform
(who may also happen to hold academic posts). A plausible division of labor is that the
reformer should deliberately ignore political feasibility; she should simply propose firstbest plans and programs and then let politics itself filter the feasible from the infeasible.
The reformer is typically an expert in the substantive area at hand, not in politics, so selfcensoring in light of the reformer’s estimate of political feasibility carries the risk that the
reformer will mistakenly filter out an ideal solution that would actually have been
enacted. By contrast, the opposite error – the proposal of ideal solutions that are
politically infeasible – is solved automatically by the operation of the political filter. For
these reasons, reform proposals such as that offered by Carrington and Cramton are
socially very valuable, even if, from the analyst’s standpoint, they are systematically
likely to fail.

37
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